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Abstract: In this paper it is argued that the size distribution of firms may largely be deter-
mined by institutional factors. This hypothesis is tested in an exploratory fashion by studying 
the evolution of the size distribution of firms over time in Sweden for a period spanning from 
the late 1960s to the early 1990s. The data used is divided into finer size classes compared to 
most  previous  studies.  This  gives  more scope for investigating the impact of institutions. 
Moreover, we use a unique data set, starting in 1984, to take account of corporate groups and 
government ownership. The analysis shows a poor development for intermediate-sized (10–
199 employees) firms. This is likely to reflect the existence of a threshold that many firms are 
either unwilling or unable to cross. The analysis of the institutions and rules of the game 
determining  the  entrepreneurial  and  business  conditions  in  Sweden  indicate  that  the 
conditions have been unfavorable for small firms, and hence that too few small firms have 
managed  to  grow  out  of  the  smallest  size  classes.  The  conclusion  is  supported  by  an 
international comparison of the number of firms in different size classes. Data indicate that 
Sweden has fewer small (10–99 employees), and more large (500+) firms per capita than 
other European countries. 
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In the 1950s and 1960s, large production units organized within the framework of 
vertically integrated large corporate groups were almost universally viewed as one of 
the most important elements in the overall model for economic and social development. 
With the turbulence that emerged after the oil and energy price shocks of 1973, 
however, there began to emerge evidence that bigger may not necessarily be better. A 
number of spectacular cases arose where larger enterprises ran into economic 
difficulties, and, simply in order to survive, were forced to shed employment. As the 
service sectors became dramatically more important, the advantages of large size 
appeared to decline significantly. The apparent advantages of large size seemed to 
disappear further as many manufacturing firms painfully downsized. Increasingly, large 
firms were viewed as inflexible, as slow to adapt to changing market conditions and 
increasingly quality-conscious consumers, as unconscionably firing workers, becoming 
less competitive in international markets, and shamelessly turning more and more to 
government for help in reversing their self-inflicted fortunes. Many researchers – e.g., 
Piore and Sabel (1984) and Scott (1988) – began to emphasize flexible specialization as 
a key factor for development at both the firm and regional level. 
  Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) compiled evidence in support of the view 
that the previous upward trend in the relative importance of large firms was reversed. 
They report similar recent trends toward small production units, using establishment 
rather than enterprise data. They conclude that there is ”a clear picture of a recent 
general trend toward smaller units of production” in the six largest OECD countries. 
This new trend is first discernible in the U.S. around 1970 but the same pattern is shown 
to follow with little delay in the other large countries.  
  But as shown by Henrekson (1996) and Davis and Henrekson (1997a) it appears 
that in Sweden large firms and production units tended to increase in relative 
importance at least through the mid 1980s. They also report that large firms and 
establishments were more predominant in Sweden than in perhaps any other country. 
Thus, it is possible to find examples negating the ”received wisdom”, that large firms 
began to decline in relative importance throughout the industrialized world in the 1970s 
(allegedly for inexorable technological and structural reasons).1 Furthermore, common 
trends notwithstanding, there are large national differences in the employment share of 
small and/or medium-sized firms. For instance, Loveman and Sengenberger report a 
small firm (< 100 employees) share in manufacturing around 1980 of 55.3 percent for 
Italy, but only 15.0 and 18.8 percent for Germany and the U.K., respectively. In the six 
countries studied there appear to be systematic differences between Italy and Japan on 
                                                 
1See Carlsson (1996) for a good elaboration on these issues.   2 
the one hand and Germany and the U.K. on the other, with the U.S. and France as 
intermediate, less clear-cut, cases.  
  Davis and Henrekson (1997b) hypothesize that cross-country differences in the 
size distribution of employment should primarily be explained by national differences in 
institutions and economic policies. Empirically they test their hypothesis by 
characterizing these aspects of the economic policy environment in Sweden prior to 
1990 or thereabouts and compare them to the situation in other European countries and 
the United States. Their characterization and international comparisons show that 
Swedish policies strongly disfavored less capital-intensive firms and sectors, smaller 
firms, entry by new firms, and individual and family ownership of business. They also 
compile evidence that these policies affected outcomes. Taking the U.S. industrial 
distribution as a benchmark that reflects a comparatively neutral set of policies and 
institutions, Sweden’s employment distribution in the mid-1980s was found to be 
sharply tilted away from industries with greater employment shares for smaller firms 
and establishments.  
  Davis and Henrekson chiefly support their claim that the size (and industrial) 
distribution of firms is largely determined by institutional factors by a detailed study of 
U.S.–Swedish differences at a single point in time. A further test of their hypothesis can 
be had by studying the evolution of the size distribution of firms over time. This is the 
route taken in this paper. More specifically, we investigate changes in the number and 
size distribution of firms in Sweden in the period 1968–93. Compared to studies for 
other countries this is an unusually long time period. A further advantage of our data set 
is that we can include more size classes compared to the Loveman-Sengenberger 
analysis. A finer disaggregation gives more scope for investigating the impact of 
institutions. Size distribution data for Swedish firms are also more comprehensive than 
the data for many other countries, notably, it is possible to take account of corporate 
groups and government ownership. The Swedish size distribution of firms is also 
compared to the size distribution in eleven other European countries. Finally, we argue 
that the evolution of the size distribution of firms in Sweden is consistent with the 
development and structure of important institutions and rules of the game likely to 
affect the distribution of firms, the rate of entry of new firms and the willingness to 
expand among incumbent firms.  
  The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we report the number and the 
change in the number of Swedish enterprises between 1968 and 1993. Among other 
things we use a unique data set taking into account corporate groups and government 
ownership. Section 3 contains an international comparison and in the next section we 
survey recent research documenting a low willingness to grow among Swedish firms. In 
section 5 we analyse the most important institutions and rules of the game pertaining to 
business conditions and entrepreneurship in Sweden. Section 6 concludes.    3 
 
 
2.  Growth and the Size Distribution of Firms in Sweden 
 
Universally accepted definitions of small, large and medium-sized firms are lacking in 
the literature. From time to time this fact causes some confusion. For instance, in the 
European Community firms with 0–9 employees are called micro firms, those with 10–
99 and 100–499 are denoted small and medium-sized, respectively, and firms with 500 
or more employees are considered to be large. However, in mid 1996 EC recommended 
its member countries to change the definition of large firms to firms with 250 
employees or more. Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) draw the line between small and 
medium sized at 100 employees and define firms with at least 500 employees as large. 
Among small business researchers in Sweden the demarcation line between small and 
large has in most cases been drawn at 200 employees (e.g., NUTEK, 1994, Davidsson et 
al., 1994, 1996). Thus, a great many firms considered large in Sweden would be dubbed 
medium-sized internationally. In our view, if one really wants to gain useful insights 
about the evolution of the size distribution of firms and its determinants, far too much 
information is lost when firms are classified into such broad categories. Suffice it here 
to say that the large majority of firms are in the 0–1 employees size class. When 
possible, one should therefore use a more detailed division of firms.  
  Since 1968 Statistics Sweden publishes data on the number of firms in the 
following size classes (number of employees excluding the owner): 0–1, 2–4, 5–9, 10–
19, 20–49, 50–99, 100–199, 200–499 and 500+. The data are taken from the Central 
Register of Enterprises and Establishments (CFAR) compiled and published by 
Statistics Sweden. CFAR contains all production units – profit and non-profit as well as 
private and state-owned – having employees or a turnover exceeding a certain amount 
(originally SEK 10,000). A number of changes of the reporting criteria have been 
carried out since 1968, which affects the number of reported firms. The change in the 
number of firms in the smallest size class is highly uncertain due to these changes. The 
number of reported firms in the largest size class in the whole economy is greatly 
influenced by the fact that local and regional governments are included in the statistics, 
see Johansson (1997) for further details.  
  Below we will examine the evolution of the size distribution of firms both for 
the whole economy and for manufacturing taken separately.2 Throughout we report the 
number of firms per million inhabitants in order to take account of population change. 
                                                 
2Previous studies covering a longer time period have generally used establishments as the observational 
unit, and in most cases they have covered manufacturing only, e.g., Braunerhjelm and Carlsson (1993) 
and Carlsson (1992). Particular interest has also been devoted to the importance of large firms in the 
Swedish economy, e.g., Jagrén (1993).   4 
In order to avoid confusion with the numerous definitions of medium-sized firms, we 
have chosen to use the term intermediate-sized for the firms in the size classes 
highlighted in this study, i.e., size classes covering 10–199 employee firms. 
  Between 1968 and 1993 the number of firms in the smallest size class (0–1) 
increased considerably (Table 1). Due to the numerous changes in the reporting criteria, 
this reported increase should be interpreted with caution. The number of firms also 
increased in the 2–4 employee size class (by 22 per cent), in the 5–9 class (24 per cent), 
10–19 class (14 per cent), 20–49 class (1 per cent), 200–499 class (8 per cent) and in the 
500+ class (61 per cent), while it decreased in the 20–49 and 50–99 size classes (by 8 
and 7 per cent, respectively). The increase in the largest size class is partially misleading 
because of the inclusion of local and regional governments in the statistics from 1979. If 
we instead calculate the change between 1979 and 1993 the increase dwindles to a mere 
7 per cent. Thus, we may conclude that the development of the number of firms 
corrected for population is weak for the whole economy in the entire interval 20–199 
employees compared to other size classes.  
 
 
Table 1   The Number of Firms per Million Inhabitants in Different Size Classes, the 
  Entire Swedish Economy 1968–93. 
 
Size Class  1968  1993  Change (%) 
0–1  15474  39885  158 
2–4  6232  7598  22 
5–9  2587  3196  24 
10–19  1404  1599  14 
20–49  909  916  1 
50–99  307  283  –8 
100–199  152  141  –7 
200–499  88  95  8 
500+  57 (86)  92  61 (7) 
Note: From 1979 local and regional governments are included, which strongly influences the number of 
reported firms in the largest size class. The figures in brackets show the number and the change in the 
number of firms when 1979 is used as the base year.  
Source: Statistical Abstracts of Sweden and own calculations.  
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Table 2   The Number of Firms per Million Inhabitants in Different Size Classes, 
  Swedish Manufacturing 1968–93. 
 
Size Class  1968  1993  Change (%) 
0–1  945  2725  188 
2–4  806  780  –3 
5–9  547  479  –12 
10–19  410  281  –31 
20–49  318  222  –30 
50–99  124  90  –27 
100–199  72  49  –31 
200–499  42  36  –15 
500+  30  26  –14 
Source: Statistical Abstracts of Sweden and own calculations. 
 
 
In Table 2 we report the change in the number of firms in manufacturing between 1968 
and 1993. Here too, the number of firms in the smallest size class has soared (by 188 
per cent). This strong increase is in all likelihood a chimera due to revised reporting 
routines. In all other size classes the number of firms decreased during the period under 
study. The decrease is particularly pronounced in the intermediate size classes (10–199), 
where the number of firms went down by approximately one third. In the other size 
classes (2–4, 5–9, 200–499, 500+) the decrease is substantially smaller. The reduction 
of the number of intermediate-sized firms is approximately double compared to the 
reduction in the other size classes.3  
  The interpretation of the data presented so far is rendered less clear-cut by two 
circumstances: government owned and nonprofit production units are included and 
account is taken of the fact that many of the firms treated as independent by Statistics 
Sweden in the published sources are part of a larger corporate group.4 First, private 
firms operate in most cases under widely different conditions than government 
controlled production units. Second, the observed changes in the number of private 
firms will also be misleading, if for example, a large firm splits up its operations into a 
number of (possibly tightly controlled) subsidiaries. We use a unique data set from 
Statistics Sweden, where a distinction has been drawn between private/government 
ownership and where it is possible to identify if a formally independent legal entity is 
part of a corporate group. Thus, those two problems can be avoided. See Johansson 
(1997) for further details.  
                                                 
3This shows that the size classes used by, for instance, Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) may be so 
broad that many economically interesting phenomena remain undetected.  
4By corporate group we mean a more comprehensive entity where the capital links between the legal units 
are taken into account, meaning that all the controlled enterprises are considered together. The term 
enterprise group is often used synonymously in the literature (Eurostat, 1997).   6 
  In short, the data used have been adjusted as follows: (i) all governmentally 
owned and operated production units have been excluded; (ii) each parent company and 
its subsidiaries have been merged into a single observational unit (a corporate group); 
(iii) the corporate groups have been classified into the respective size class; (iv) each 
firm is classified into the industry in which the majority of its employees work. A 
distinction between private and government ownership can be made from 1972. During 
the 1970s Statistics Sweden began to compile a register of Swedish corporate groups. 
The register is comprehensive since 1984. Thus, we report group adjusted data for the 
whole private sector and manufacturing for the period 1984–93. Table 3 shows that 
when firms are defined as corporate groups, the number of intermediate-sized firms in 
the private sector declines with the exception of the 10–19 size class.5 The tendency 
towards a reduced number of intermediate-sized firms is even more apparent in 
manufacturing. The decline is particularly salient among firms with 50–99 and 100–199 
employees. However, it should be observed that the number of corporate groups also 
decreases in the largest size class. The reasons for this is unclear, but it is likely that 
mergers and acquisitions play a role in this development. 
 
 
Table 3  The Number of Private Firms per Million Inhabitants in Different Size Classes 
  in Sweden, Total Private Sector and Manufacturing 1984–93. 
 
  Total Private Sector  Manufacturing 
  1984  1993  Change (%)  1984  1993  Change (%) 
2–4  5705  7232  27  683  741  8 
5–9  2574  2933  14  450  439  –2 
10–19  1340  1360  1  321  246  –23 
20–49  705  696  –1  219  171  –22 
50–99  210  191  –9  78  58  –26 
100–199  92  85  –8  39  26  –33 
200–499  54  54  0  22  23  5 
500+  39  35  –10  19  16  –16 
Note: Firms with 0–1 employees are excluded. 
Source: The Central Register of Enterprises and Establishments (CFAR) and own calculations. 
 
The employment share of the intermediate-sized firms also decreased in the 1984–93 
period – see Table 4. The employment share of the firms (groups) in the largest size 
class has also gone down, although considerably less than for the intermediate-sized 
groups. The change in the employment pattern for the entire private sector is similar. 
                                                 
5We have also calculated the change in the number of private firms (without adjusting for corporate 
groups) between 1972 and 1993. The results are similar and are therefore not reported.    7 
The employment share decreased in all size classes with 10 employees or more, and the 
decrease was larger for groups with 50–99 and 100–199 employees.  
 
 
Table 4  The Size Distribution of Employment in the Total Private Sector and 
  Manufacturing in Sweden, Adjusted for Groups 1984–93 (%). 
 
Total Private Sector                   
Size Class  0–1  2–4   5–9   10–19  20–49   50–99  100–199  200–499  500+  Sum 
1984  2.0  6.6  7.1  7.7  8.9  6.1  5.3  7.1  49.1  100 
1993  2.7  8.1  7.9  7.6  8.6  5.5  4.9  6.8  47.8  100 
Change (%)  35.0  22.7  11.3  –1.3  –3.4  –9.8  –7.5  –4.2  –2.6   
Manufacturing                 
Size Class  0–1  2–4    5–9    10–19    20–49    50–99  100–199  200–499  500+  Sum 
1984  0.4  2.0  3.1  4.5  6.8  5.5  5.4  6.9  65.5  100 
1993  0.5  2.6  3.6  4.2  6.4  5.1  4.6  9.1  63.8  100 
Change (%)  25.0  30.0  16.1  –6.7  –5.9  –7.3  –14.8  31.9  –2.6   
Source: The Central Register of Enterprises and Establishments (CFAR) and own calculations.  
 
 
When governmentally owned production units are excluded and adjustments for 
corporate groups are made, the previously observed pattern is reconfirmed. Irrespective 
of whether we examine the total population of firms, private firms or corporate groups 
in manufacturing we observe: (i) the number of intermediate-sized firms have declined 
more rapidly than the number of firms in the other size classes; (ii) the share of the 
number of firms that are intermediate-sized has declined; (iii) the employment share of 
intermediate-sized firms has diminished. The pattern for the whole private sector is 
similar. The only difference is that this pattern only applies in full to the 20–199 size 
class.  
  In the literature we have only managed to find one paper examining the 
evolution of the number of firms across several countries. Schwalbach (1994) examines 
the change in the number of firms in the manufacturing sector in France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom and Denmark. The firms were classified into the three size classes 20–
99, 100–499 and 500+ employees, and the development during the period 1979–86 was 
analysed. The highest rate of growth of the number of firms was found in the smallest 
size class, while the number of large firms grew at the lowest rate. If we instead 
calculate the percentage change in the number of Swedish manufacturing firms for the 
same time period and size classes, the pattern is reversed – the number of large firms 
grew most rapidly, while the number of firms in the 20–99 size class actually declined. 
Thus, the evolution of the number of firms in Sweden appears to diverge from the 
findings by Schwalbach for these four comparable countries, and the impression of a 
weak development among intermediate-sized firms in Sweden is further strengthened. 
   8 
 
3.  Sweden Compared to Other European Countries 
 
In order to test comprehensively our hypothesis that the evolution of the size 
distribution of firms is largely determined by institutional factors, we should ideally 
look at the evolution of the size distribution and the institutional framework in a number 
of countries. However, such an approach raises formidable data problems that seem 
insurmountable at this point. Moreover, much care would be required in spelling out the 
characteristics and implications of country-specific institutions, a cumbersome task way 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
  Lack of data makes a detailed international comparison of the size distribution of 
firms difficult and limited in scope. The statistical material presented in Enterprises in 
Europe, I–IV (Eurostat 1990, 1992 1995, 1997) render possible a preliminary 
comparison across European countries. The surveys include all firms, except firms 
active in the primary sector and firms active in non-market services and public 
administration. Firms with a turnover below a certain threshold are excluded as well.6 
The first report covered 12 countries, and in the fourth report the number of countries 
had been extended to a total of 16.  
  In the first, second and third report, firms were classified as micro-sized (0–9 
employees) firms, small-sized (10–99 employees) firms, medium-sized (100–499) firms 
and large-sized (500+ employees) firms. The fourth report uses another definition of 
size classes: very small (1–9 employees) firms, small (10–49 employees) firms, 
medium-sized (50–249 employees) firms and large (250+ employees) firms.  
  Several severe statistical difficulties that have a large impact on comparability 
are mentioned in the reports. For instance, some countries do not report enterprises, but 
establishment or some other unit. The coverage of sectors and size classes are not 
complete either. Data are especially uncertain in the first report (covering 1983 and 
1986), the first source of information ever with the ambition of providing harmonised 
data on the number of enterprises in different size classes in different countries. 
However, the registers were not fully harmonised or completed, a task still not fully 
accomplished. For example Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Spain and Luxembourg have 
changed their sources of information since the publication of the first report. Therefore, 
we start our analysis with the second report (covering 1988 and 1989). We have also 
excluded Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland from the analysis. Greece, Ireland and Austria do not use enterprises as 
their reporting units and have deficient coverage in years and/or sectors. In the 
Netherlands, yet another reporting unit is used and the data are incomplete in sectors of 
                                                 
6The threshold differs between countries.    9 
activities and size classes.7 Iceland and Switzerland both use enterprises as the reporting 
unit, but the data for Iceland do not cover medium and large-sized enterprises. For 
Switzerland data are only reported for 1991. Generally, data for the industrial sector 
(defined as NACE 1–4, i.e., extraction, manufacturing and energy) are far more reliable 
than data for all sectors.8 At this stage we judge that the size distribution data for the 
whole economy suffer from such severe comparability problems that an intercountry 
comparison would probably be misleading. For this reason, we focus on the industrial 
sector.  
  The Swedish data in the reports are provided by Statistics Sweden and based on 
the Enterprises Financial Accounts survey (EFA). EFA contains detailed financial 
information such as turnover and value added, but it does not cover the whole 
population of firms. For example, enterprises active in the financial sector and sole 
proprietorships are excluded. The Swedish data are also reported in such a way that is 
impossible to distinguish the micro and small size classes. Thus, if one is solely 
interested in the number of enterprises CFAR is a better register than EFA, and we have 
used data based on CFAR in the inter-country comparison. However, CFAR covers all 
firms, i.e. it includes enterprises active in non-market services and public 
administration. This exaggerates the number of Swedish firms in all sectors, but not the 
number of firms in the industrial sector. So far the CFAR has not been adjusted to the 
new definition of medium and large firms used in the fourth report. Hence, we have to 
adhere to the definitions in the first three reports.  
  Davidsson et al. (1996) have shown that changes of the turnover threshold have 
a great impact on the number of the smallest Swedish firms. The inclusion/exclusion of 
sole proprietorships also has a great effect on the reported number of smaller firms 
(Johansson, 1997). Since all countries included in the Eurostat reports use different 
thresholds and different criteria for including sole proprietorships, comparisons of the 
reported number of micro firms are likely to be misleading. In consequence, they are 
excluded from our country comparisons below. 
  First, the average number of enterprises in each size class is calculated for the 
period 1988 to 1991. The average number is then used to calculate the size distribution 
of firms. The results from these calculations are displayed in Table 5. 
 
 
                                                 
7Belgium and Denmark also use a different reporting unit, but have good coverage of sectors, years and 
size classes and are therefore included. 
8For example, Italy does not report the number of firms in NACE 9 (other services).   10 
Table 5   The  Average  Number  and  the  Size  Distribution  of  Firms  per  Million 
  Inhabitants in the Industrial Sector, 1988–91 (rank in parentheses). 
 
  Firms per million inhabitants    Size distribution 
  Small  Medium  Large    Small  Medium  Large  Sum 
Germany  1187 (3)  144 (2)  33 (2)    87.0 (7)  10.6 (6)  2.4 (6)  100 
France  669 (10)  84 (9)  19 (10)    86.7 (8)  10.9 (5)  2.4 (7)  100 
U.K.  650 (12)  75 (11)  22 (5)    87.1 (6)  10.0 (7)  2.9 (4)  100 
Sweden  774 (8)  112 (5)  34 (1)    84.1 (11)  12.1 (2)  3.7 (1)  100 
Italy  1365 (2)  77 (10)  11 (11)    93.9 (1)  5.3 (12)  .8 (12)  100 
Spain  1055 (5)  74 (12)  10 (12)    92.6 (2)  6.5 (11)  .9 (11)  100 
Belgium  678 (9)  91 (7)  21 (8)    85.8 (10)  11.6 (3)  2.6 (5)  100 
Portugal  1504 (1)  161 (1)  21 (7)    89.2 (4)  9.5 (9)  1.3 (10)  100 
Denmark  1131 (4)  124 (4)  21 (9)    88.7 (5)  9.7 (8)  1.6 (9)  100 
Luxembourg  668 (11)  141 (3)  26 (4)    80.1 (12)  16.9 (1)  3.1 (2)  100 
Finland  787 (7)  101 (6)  27 (3)    86.0 (9)  11.1 (4)  3.0 (3)  100 
Norway  895 (6)  86 (8)  21 (6)    89.3 (3)  8.6 (10)  2.1 (8)  100 
Average  947  106  22    87.5  10.2  2.2  100 
Note: Small, medium, and large firms are defined as firms with 10–99, 100–499 and 500+ employees, 
respectively. The geographical coverage for Germany is the former Federal Republic of Germany.  
Source: Eurostat (1992, 1994), Statistics Sweden and own calculations.  
 
 
Sweden on average has the greatest number of large industrial firms per capita among 
the countries compared. Here Sweden is followed closely by Germany, but then there is 
a leap to Finland. In terms of medium-sized industrial firms per capita Sweden is about 
average, while it ranks below average in the small size class. The impression that 
Sweden has many large but comparatively few small firms compared to other European 
countries is strengthened when we analyze the size distribution of firms. Sweden now 
ranks as number 1 in the large size class, and the distance to the 2nd ranking country is 
greater. Sweden also has a large share of medium-sized firms according to this 
definition. The share of small-sized industrial firms, however, is reported to be the 
second smallest among the countries included in the comparison.  
  The low number per capita and the small proportion of small sized Swedish 
firms are particularly interesting considering the analysis carried out in the previous 
section. The small size class in the international comparison includes three of the four 
size classes that we named intermediate-sized firms viz., the 10–19, 20–49 and 50–99 
classes. In the previous section it was shown that the number of intermediate-sized 
firms had declined substantially in manufacturing. Thus, the international comparison at   11 
a single point in time is consistent with the above finding of a poor development for 
intermediate-sized firms. 
  Taken together these empirical findings raise the question whether Swedish 
institutions have been an obstacle to growth for intermediate-sized firms (and favoured 
large-sized firms)? We will investigate this question in the next two sections.  
 
 
4. Some Evidence on the Willingness to Grow Among Swedish Firms 
 
A number of studies have documented a weak inclination to grow among small firms in 
Sweden. For instance, Lundström et al. (1993) find that merely 10–15 percent of the 
small firms expand employment. But do small and newly started businesses want to 
grow? In order to shed light on this question a number of studies are useful to look at. 
Aronsson (1991) examined 535 firms established in 1988. Three years later turnover 
exceeded SEK 1 million in no more than one fourth of the firms, and one third of them 
had no full-time employee, the owner included. From Aronsson’s study one can infer a 
number of reasons why the proclivity to expand was so low among the studied firms: (i) 
a lack of motivation among the founders of the firms; (ii) expansion was considered too 
costly in terms of after-tax capital requirements; (iii) many owners perceived that 
expansion would increase the risk due to more staff and cumbersome administration.  
  Roughly a decade earlier Utterback and Reitberger (1982) reached similarly 
dismal conclusions in their comprehensive interview study of 60 firms based on new 
technology.9 Lundström et al. (1993), in a survey of the willingness to grow of small 
firms written for the so-called Lindbeck Commission, single out a low desire to expand 
as the factor most responsible for thwarting growth — they claim that 19 out of 20 
small firms simply do not want to grow! The Davidsson et al. (1994) study of single 
establishment firms (the majority of small firms) revealed that in 1989 – an extreme 
boom year in Sweden – only 15.7 percent of these firms had added employees, while 
13.6 percent of them had cut back on staff that same year.  
  NUTEK (1996, pp. 97–100) report that there are 50,000 firms in Sweden that 
can, but do not want to grow. In the same report they also cite evidence that back in 
1987 there was survey evidence showing that 28 percent of the firms saw a potential for 
expansion in their own market that ”they did not intend to take advantage of.”  
                                                 
9Utterback and Reitberger (1982, pp. 99–100) write: ”The most clearly negative factor that we have 
discovered in our extensive conversations with entrepreneurs and reviews of various sources of data, is 
the degree to which the positive motivation of people in Sweden to take risks in creating new 
manufacturing firms and to make them grow to significant size appears to be declining. While we have 
looked for evidence to reject this hypothesis, each source of information or data to which we have turned 
appears to reinforce it. ... In sum, it appears that the Swedish economy is becoming increasingly reliant on 
fewer and larger enterprises as the sources of its continuing creativity and competitive potential in 
international markets at home.”   12 
  Thus, it is easy to point out a number of studies indicating a lack of motivation 
to expand among small firms. No doubt, this finding is very much in line with the weak 
evolution of intermediate-sized firms documented above. The pool of firms in the 
intermediate size classes is tapped through mergers, take-overs and, at least in some 
cases, expansion into the group of large firms. At the same time, a low willingness to 
grow will lead to few firms growing out of the very smallest size classes. Thus a gradual 
depletion of the pool of intermediate-sized firms is likely, which is exactly what we 
reported in section 2 above.  
  A low willingness to grow among intermediate-sized firms may cause serious 
economic problems, such as high and persistent unemployment. According to Birch, 
Haggerty and Parsons (1995) a few very fast growing firms, so called ”gazelles” create 
the majority of jobs in the U.S. If, for some reason, very few Swedish potential gazelles 
find it worthwhile to expand or if there are institutional impediments to their growth 
this might be one explanation for Sweden’s dismal employment performance in recent 
decades, notably the fact that all employment growth since 1950 has taken place in the 
public sector (Davis and Henrekson, 1997a). 
  We believe that it is a challenging task to try to understand at a more 
fundamental level what factors underlie the documented unwillingness to grow, the 
weak evolution of the number of intermediate sized firms, and the few small firms in 
Sweden compared to many other similar countries in Europe. Could there be a 
straightforward economic explanation for this lack of motivation to expand? Certain 
results suggest that this is the case. For example, 40 percent of the small firm managers 
interviewed in Davidsson’s (1989) study did not believe that expansion would have a 
positive effect on their personal finances. In the next section we will argue that these 
patterns are a rational outcome of unfavourable rules and institutions facing small firms, 




5.  Entrepreneurial and Business Conditions in Sweden 
 
The development of the size distribution of firms and employment described in section 
2 and the result in section 3 that Sweden has more large and fewer small-sized firms per 
capita than most other European countries raises the question whether Swedish 
institutions and economic policies have acted as impediments to growth for small and 
newly started businesses. Our hypothesis is that the development can largely be 
explained as the outcome of the institutions and rules of the game pertinent to   13 
entrepreneurial activity in Sweden. In this section we will briefly point out a number of 
factors that may be of importance in these respects.10  
 
Tax Policy. Until the 1990/91 tax reform Swedish tax policy greatly disfavoured new, 
small and less capital-intensive firms, while large firms as well as institutional 
ownership was highly favored. During an extended period of time, for three decades 
beginning in the early 1960s, there were extreme differences in taxation for different 
sources of finance and owner categories: (i) debt was the most favored and new share 
issues the most disfavored; (ii) households/individuals were taxed substantially more 
heavily than other owner categories. To provide a sense of the magnitude of the 
distortions caused by the Swedish tax system, Table 6 presents effective marginal tax 
rates for different combinations of owners and sources of finance. Three categories of 
owners and sources of finance are identified, and the effective marginal tax rate is 
calculated assuming a pre-tax real rate of return of 10 percent. A negative number 
means that the real rate of return is greater after tax than before tax. Around 1980 the 
distortive traits of the system were most prominent. An investment yielding a pre-tax 
real rate of return of 10 per cent financed by a debt instrument meant that the tax-
exempt institution received a real rate of return of 18.3 per cent after tax. For a 
household investing in a newly issued share with the same real rate of return the 
situation was very different: 10 per cent before tax became –3.7 per cent after tax. 
Naturally, tax rules benefiting debt financing relative to equity financing and 
institutional relative to individual ownership systematically favored large, real capital 
intensive, publicly traded and well-established firms.  
  Studies such as King and Fullerton (1984) and Fukao and Hanazaki (1987) also 
show that Swedish tax policy was extreme in these respects. Furthermore, the Swedish 
tax system generally subsidized housing investment. The very high marginal tax rates 
on individual income – the top marginal rate was close to 90 per cent in the early 1980s 
– also discouraged economic activities that are highly substitutable between market and 
home production sectors (laundering, painting, home repairs, et cetera), and reduced the 
rate of return on human capital investment. At the same time the high marginal taxes 
created a strong incentive for individuals to save in the form of fully tax deductible 
pension plans. This channeled financial savings to large institutions (as a rule highly 
regulated) and thus reduced the supply of equity financing for potential entrepreneurs 
and extant small businesses. 
 
 
                                                 
10This section builds a great deal on Henrekson (1996) and Davis and Henrekson (1997a).    14 
Table 6  Effective  Marginal  Tax  Rate  for  Different  Combinations  of  Owners  and 
  Source of Finance, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1985 and 1991 (real pre-tax rate of 
  return 10% at actual inflation rates). 
 




1960       
Households  27.2  92.7  48.2 
Tax exempt institutions  –32.2  31.4  31.2 
Insurance companies  –21.7  41.6  34.0 
       
1970       
Households  51.3  122.1  57.1 
Tax exempt institutions  –64.8  15.9  32.7 
Insurance companies  –45.1  42.4  41.2 
       
1980       
Households  58.2  136.6  51.9 
Tax exempt institutions  –83.4  –11.6  11.2 
Insurance companies  –54.9  38.4  28.7 
       
1985       
Households  46.6  112.1  64.0 
Tax exempt institutions  –46.8  6.8  28.7 
Insurance companies  –26.5  32.2  36.3 
       
1991       
Households  31.7  61.8  54.2 
Tax exempt institutions  –9.4  4.0  18.7 
Insurance companies  14.4  33.3  31.6 
Note: All calculations are based on the actual asset composition in manufacturing. The following inflation 
rates were used: 1960: 3%, 1970: 7%, 1980: 9.4%, 1985: 5%, 1991: 5%. The calculations conform to the 
general framework developed by King and Fullerton (1984). The average holding period of an asset is 
assumed to be 10 years. 
Source: Jan Södersten, see also Södersten (1984, 1993). 
 
 
Credit Market Policy. Throughout the postwar period until the late 1980s, the Swedish 
credit market was highly regulated. Priority was given to lending to the public sector and 
housing. The credit volume to other sectors was generally subjected to quantitative 
restrictions and the rate of interest was also regulated, which resulted in a situation of 
virtually continuous credit rationing (SOU 1982:52; Henrekson, 1992). This set of 
regulations clearly favored credit access by larger, older, firmly established firms and by 
real capital-intensive firms with ready sources of collateral. Since deregulation did not 
take place until the late 1980s, our data can be expected to be largely unaffacted by this 
change.   15 
 
The National Pension System. The mandatory national pension system (ATP) instituted 
in 1960 transformed the public sector into the most important supplier of credit. Large 
surpluses were accumulated in the national pension funds, the so-called AP funds. In 
the early 1970s, the AP funds accounted for 35 per cent of total credit supply. The 
decision to accumulate savings to such a great extent in the AP funds led to a massive 
further institutionalization of savings, which in all likelihood benefited large, well-
established firms with a good credit rating that could operate on a high debt-equity ratio. 
  Undoubtedly, the structure of the Swedish tax and pension system reduced 
private wealth accumulation. The mandatory pension system, as long as it was 
considered viable, removed an important incentive for private saving. There are now a 
large number of studies showing that private wealth and the potential for self-financing 
are of great importance for the prospective entrepreneur regarding start-up and 
expansion. See, e.g., Lindh and Ohlsson (1996, 1998), Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1991), and Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994). This implies that the total tax burden and not just 
the marginal tax rates affect entrepreneurship and new business formations (Fazzari et 
al., 1988).11   The Swedish government has tried to offset the deficient supply of equity 
capital by encouraging the establishment of venture capital institutions. However, these 
institutions have to a very limited extent supplied equity financing to start-ups or at the 
first critical expansionary stage. NUTEK (1994, p. 113) observe that ”the funds [from 
the venture capital institutions] have primarily been channeled to large firms.”12 
 
Labor security legislation. The Swedish Employment Security Act (LAS) gives 
employees extensive protection against unfair dismissal. Under LAS the only legal 
grounds for dismissal are gross misconduct and redundancies. In the latter case, LAS 
stipulates a ”last in – first out principle”. This regulation most likely increases the cost 
of hiring and firing. There are also research findings of a different sort that are 
consistent with the view that strict labour security affects firms differently depending on 
their size and possibly also other characteristics. In an interview study Kazamaki 
Ottersten (1994) found that LAS was mostly a restriction for intermediate-sized firms. 
Large firms have typically either found ways to circumvent the rules or have learnt to 
live with them, or have made special agreements with the trade union that remove the 
costly effects. In small firms, she found that it was often the case that the importance of 
firm survival was perceived so tangibly by all employees and the trade union alike, that, 
                                                 
11See also Cressy and Olofsson (1997), who show that Swedish SMEs have a preference for financing 
expansion with retained earnings or equity supplied by the original owners relative to debt financing and 
equity from new sources.  
12Also, Rylander (1995) finds no evidence that politicians or politically controlled bodies have the 
requisite competence to allocate capital to new and small businesses. On the contrary, he provides a 
number of examples where government funding has had a negative effect on the recipients.   16 
at least in times of hardship, it was fairly easy to agree on measures that did not strictly 
adhere to LAS. Nevertheless, there are a great many firms reporting that LAS restricts 
their scope for action in such a way that a more cautious recruitment policy is adopted. 
NUTEK (1996, p. 100) draws a similar conclusion when they write that ”the 
employment security act is another example where the regulatory measures entirely go 
against the special needs that would ensure that a young rapidly growing firm would be 
able to find the right recruits. Large, established firms having scope for relocations 
within the firm are favored by this legislation.”13  
  Other evidence is also consistent with the view that employment security 
provisions fall more heavily on smaller firms and some other classes of firms. In the 
United States, both the rate at which workers separate from jobs and the rate at which 
employers destroy job positions decline with the size, age and capital intensity of the 
employer (Brown and Medoff, 1989 and Davis et al., 1996) These patterns in worker 
separation and destruction rates suggest that any costs imposed by a regulation similar 
to the LAS are likely to fall more heavily on younger, smaller and less capital-intensive 
employers and distort the distribution of employment towards industries characterized 
by more stable establishment-level employment and longer job tenures.  
 
Wage formation. As documented in many studies – see, e.g., Edin and Topel (1997) – 
the Swedish wage negotiation system produced a very narrow wage dispersion and high 
relative wages for low productivity workers. At the same time, numerous studies show 
that the wage level increases with the size, age and capital intensity of the firm (e.g., 
Brown and Medoff, 1989). By implication, the Swedish wage negotiation system has in 
many cases raised labor costs above the free-market outcome in small, new and labor 
intensive firms.  
 
Large public sector employment. Roughly one third of total employment in Sweden is 
government employment, and all net employment expansion in Sweden since 1950 has 
taken place in the public sector. The rapid expansion of public employment was the 
result of deliberate political decisions. The decisions to produce highly income-elastic 
services such as health care, care for the elderly, child care and higher education almost 
entirely in the public sector had a great impact on employment growth and the character 
of business activity in the private sector. The publicly produced services are in many 
instances amenable to small firm production.  
                                                 
13Noteboom (1993) emphasises that comprehensive regulatory measures give rise to increased transaction 
costs, and that this is likely to be a heavier burden for small firms. A reasonable hypothesis in this context 
is that the decision making in the smallest firms is highly informal, but that the degree of formalization 
and hence transaction costs rise sharply when the firm attains a certain size. Since it is normally a fixed 
cost for the firm to master the regulatory environment, the relative cost diminishes rapidly when the firm 
has reached a certain critical size.    17 
  Given that our characterisation of the institutional and regulatory environment 
shows that large firms have been favoured, the increase in the number of firms with less 
than 10 employees may appear contradictory. One explanation is of course that other 
factors, such as technical change, also impinge on the size distribution of firms. A 
number of reports claim that small-scale production has grown more competitive in 
recent decades (e.g., Loveman and Sengenberger, 1991). Of course, such factors work 
against the effect of unfavourable institutions. Blau (1987) also claims that increased 
marginal tax rates makes it more profitable to become self-employed, since self-
employment in practice results in more scope for tax deductions, and hence lowers the 
effective rate of taxation. The interviews made by Kazamaki Ottersten (1994) also give 
support for a similar conclusion. Still Sweden has few small (10–99 employees) firms 
compared to other European countries. This, of course, is in line with the findings that 
the Swedish regulatory framework has disfavoured smaller firms. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have argued that the size distribution of firms may largely be determined by 
institutional factors. This hypothesis was tested in a highly exploratory fashion by 
studying the evolution of the size distribution of firms over time in Sweden for a period 
spanning from the late 1960s to the early 1990s and the size distribution of employment 
since 1984. Our statistical analysis shows that over time the relative importance of 
intermediate-sized firms (10–199) has gradually diminished since the end of the 1960s. 
This conclusion is valid both for the whole economy, the private sector14 and for 
manufacturing. Adjustments for corporate groups, which to our knowledge have not 
been undertaken in previous studies, make little difference. The relative and also the 
absolute decline of the number of intermediate sized firms is consistent with numerous 
Swedish survey studies documenting a low willingness to grow among small firms. 
Sweden also seems to have fewer small-sized firms (10–99), and more large firms than 
most other European countries. 
  Our analysis of the pertinent institutions and rules of the game for 
entrepreneurship in Sweden showed that small firms, start-ups, less capital-intensive 
firms and family-owned businesses were disfavoured. The Swedish tax system, credit 
market regulations, the national pension system, employment security laws, wage 
setting institutions, and the public sector monopolization of the production of key 
services were shown to have such effects. Thus, seen from this perspective it is quite 
logical that the Swedish economy came to have the greatest large firm dominance 
                                                 
14With the exception of the 10–19 employee size class.   18 
among the OECD countries (Jagrén, 1993; Heum et al., 1993). There are also a number 
of policy-determined circumstances that hinder small firms from rapid growth. The 
sensitive phase when a small firm evolves from having just a few employees to the size 
where it has access to external (often institutionalized) venture capital or a sizeable flow 
of retained earnings is probably crucial in this respect. 
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